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(p. 323) Chapter 15  Sources in Legal-Positivist Theories
Law as Necessarily Posited and the Challenge of Customary Law 
Creation
I.  Introduction
The debate about positivism in general legal theory or in the international legal scholarship 
manifests so many different, if not conflicting, meanings of positivism—even among legal 
positivists themselves—that the debate about legal positivism has proved almost 
unfathomable and unintelligible.1
No other approach to theorizing international law is more closely associated with and 
dependent upon the development of an account of its sources than is positivism. The 
explanation for this is a simple and familiar one: if there is any thesis regarding (p. 324) law 
that we can uncontroversially associate with the label ‘legal positivism’, it is the view that a 
norm’s status as law, its membership in a legal order or system, is solely a matter of its 
social source without regard for its merit. Whatever their differences (and as the above 
epigraph attests, they are many), all legal positivists maintain that law is necessarily 
posited, made, or created, not discerned in the natural order of things or deduced from 
principles knowable a priori. What counts as a law-creating act in any given legal system 
depends on the practice of its legal officials; the sources of law are, in this sense, a 
contingent or arbitrary matter.
Commitment to even this relatively modest claim brings with it substantial argumentative 
burdens. Specifically, it requires international legal positivists to offer the following: (a) a 
defence of the claim that law must have a social source; (b) an argument outlining the 
possible sources of law—that is, those act-types that can count as positing or creating law; 
and (c) an argument defending or rejecting the existence of specific sources of law in a 
specific legal system; e.g. an assessment of the claim that general principles of law serve as 
a source of international law. Clearly a comprehensive treatment of these issues requires 
more than a single book chapter, or for that matter a single book. Instead, the present work 
offers partial treatments of the first two of the argumentative tasks mentioned as 
incumbent upon international legal positivists.
I begin by considering the case for legal positivism; again, understood as the relatively 
modest thesis that the existence of law is a matter of its social source, regardless of its 
merits. Arguments for this thesis are of three types: descriptive (or social scientific), 
normative (or ethical), and conceptual (or metaphysical). I aim not to adjudicate between 
these arguments but to demonstrate that what follows for the sources of international law 
from the commitment to positivism depends to a considerable extent on the specific defence 
offered for accepting it as an account of the nature of law, including international law. In 
section III: Customary International Law Creation: Orthodox and Informal Legislation 
Accounts, I focus specifically on the possibility of customary international law. Though few 
dispute that custom can, and does serve as a source of international law, there is 
widespread disagreement regarding the precise mechanism whereby customary legal 
norms come to exist. If they are to defend custom as a source of international law, 
positivists owe us a plausible account of how customary rules are made; i.e. what acts count 
as the positing or making of customary norms, and how they do so. I argue that neither the 
orthodox account of customary law formation nor those accounts in which judges make law 
based on a belief in a broad consensus regarding the desirability of there being such a law 
do so. The former fails to identify an act of positing or creation at all, while the latter is 
better characterized as informal legislation than as custom formation.2 I then (p. 325) 
 
sketch a third approach that characterizes customary norms as elements of a community’s 
normative practice, and custom-formation as normative interpretations of patterns of 
behaviour that are successfully integrated into that normative practice. This account avoids 
the chronological paradox in custom formation and accounts for various features commonly 
associated with custom, such as its binding agents even in the absence of consent. But is it 
compatible with legal positivism? I offer a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer, 
focusing particularly on its compatibility with the rationales Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz 
offer for legal positivism.
II.  Why Positivism?
One approach to defending positivism argues that it fares better than its rivals as a 
descriptive account of law, or at least law as understood in modern Western societies and by 
those living in other societies whose education has imbued them with a modern Western 
understanding of law. Positivism, advocates of this approach contend, accurately reflects 
the distinctions between law, morality, and policy that officials and subjects of modern 
Western legal orders draw.3 They point to the commonplace nature of claims to the effect 
that there ought to be a law as evidence that a norm’s merits are not sufficient to render it 
legal, and to the practice of judges rendering decisions as a matter of law while imploring 
legislators to change the law as evidence that a norm’s demerits are not sufficient to render 
it illegal.4 Furthermore, some maintain that positivism’s compatibility with the social 
scientific study of law’s causal contribution to the production of various outcomes 
strengthens its claim to properly characterize legal validity.5 Relatedly, the descriptive case 
for legal positivism avoids any controversial metaphysical commitments, not least over the 
existence of an objective and universal morality.6
All these claims are contested, of course. For example, some theorists of international law 
draw on social scientific theory and empirical research to argue that legal validity is at least 
partly a function of a norm’s effectiveness in guiding the conduct (p. 326) of international 
legal subjects, rather than its social source.7 Instead of solidifying positivism as a 
characterization of law, then, social scientific study may well lead to its supersession. A 
more fundamental challenge to the descriptive approach to justifying positivism is the claim 
that it is impossible to identify a pre-theoretical and uncontroversial data set that can serve 
as a common object of attempts to theorize the nature of law. If these sceptics are right, the 
argument for positivism will necessarily turn on an argument for why it is better to adopt 
such an account of the nature of law than any of its rivals. Such arguments take two forms: 
those that defend positivism on the ground that such an understanding of law best serves 
the end of advancing justice, and those that maintain that only positivism can account for 
law’s autonomy and authority.
The normative or ethical case for positivism comprises several distinct arguments. First, 
some positivists allege that distinguishing between a norm’s status as law and its legitimacy 
or justice can foster a critical attitude toward legal authority and so serve as a check on one 
way in which power is exercised.8 Positivism may also facilitate (morally) better outcomes 
by forcing legal officials to openly confront and publicly adjudicate conflicts between 
different moral aims, such as the realization of retributive justice and fidelity to principles 
of legality in the criminal law.9 Debate over the proper course of action in such cases will 
likely be more fruitful, and perhaps also garner greater de facto legitimacy whatever its 
resolution, if it is not construed simply as a matter of identifying what the law is. Secondly, 
by characterizing law as necessarily a product of human creation, positivism may promote 
efforts to reform particular legal systems. Moreover, the evaluation of calls for reform, or 
resistance to it, requires a clear understanding of what the law currently is distinct from a 
judgement of its merits; absent such an understanding reformers and defenders of the 
status quo may frequently speak past one another.10 Thirdly, some may defend positivism on 
pragmatic grounds, arguing that at least in certain (p. 327) environments law can serve as 
 
an effective means to realizing certain desirable ends only if its validity is distinguished 
from its merits. Benedict Kingsbury argues that this type of normative argument undergirds 
the orthodox international legal positivism of Lassa Oppenheim.11
A final category of arguments for legal positivism comprises those that defend it on 
conceptual or metaphysical grounds. For example, orthodox international legal positivism 
follows from the conjunction of the following claims: (i) States are free and equal (moral) 
agents; (ii) where international law exists it is necessarily binding, i.e. it necessarily enjoys 
authority over its subjects, who are under a correlative duty to obey it; and (iii) the 
authoritative or binding nature of international law can be reconciled with the freedom and 
equality of States only via their consent to be bound by it. Genuine international law, then, 
can consist of nothing other than those positive rules to which States have explicitly (in the 
case of treaties) or implicitly (in the case of custom) agreed to abide. Unlike Oppenheim’s 
normative argument, this defence of positivism does not rest on a hypothesis regarding the 
conditions for an effective legal order, but is simply a consequence of a proper appreciation 
of the nature of law and the (moral) standing of States. And since this argument employs 
conceptual and meta-ethical premises, pointing to its failure to characterize as such various 
norms generally taken to be international law will not refute it. All three of its premises are 
suspect, however. For example, while it may be true that as a type of practical authority law 
necessarily claims legitimacy, it need not follow that law enjoys the authority it claims over 
all, or even any, of its subjects.12 Furthermore, consent may be neither necessary nor 
sufficient to reconcile law’s authority over an agent with that agent’s status as free and 
equal. It is not necessary if communitarian claims of membership and identity enjoy a 
justificatory priority to claims grounded in autonomy, or if respect for other agents’ status 
as free and equal requires submission to a common order of public law. It is not sufficient if, 
in contrast to consent to the performance of a specific act, consent to authority marks not 
the exercise of autonomy or self-governance, but its abdication.13
Joseph Raz offers a conceptual argument for positivism that takes as its starting point law’s 
self-image as a practical authority. Law necessarily claims a right to its subjects’ deference, 
to their guiding their conduct according to its judgement regarding what they have reason 
to do or not do, an idea that Raz spells out in terms of law purporting to provide its subjects 
with content-independent and exclusionary reasons for action.14 Law is legitimate, its claim 
to authority justified, (p. 328) if its subjects are more likely to act on the reasons that apply 
to them by deferring to the law than by acting on their own judgement regarding what they 
have most reason to do.15 This condition may not be met, and so law may lack the 
legitimacy it claims. Nevertheless, the possibility of law playing this mediating role between 
agents and the reasons that apply to them depends on its subjects being able to identify 
what the law is without deliberating on those reasons. Law’s social source(s) make it 
possible for law to play this mediating role, as they enable agents to identify what the law is 
by appeal to its origin in some agent’s positing, e.g., that X is not to be done. Thus, for Raz 
positivism follows from the (or our) concept of law and an account of practical rationality; 
i.e. a metaphysical account of human nature and of reasons.
Kelsen’s defence of positivism is grounded in the characterization of law as essentially 
normative, as necessarily composed of claims or ought-statements, and the metaphysical 
thesis that fact and value—Is and Ought—are categorically distinct and so irreducible to 
one another. Given their nature as claims or prescriptions, legal norms exist by virtue of 
some act of claiming or prescribing; that is, by virtue of being posited. Specifically, norms 
exist as law by virtue of their creation according to a higher-order norm on law-making, 
whose existence in turn may depend on its being authored according to a still higher norm 
on law-making. Vis-à-vis legal argument, the making of legal claims and counter-claims, this 
hierarchy terminates in a historically first constitution. Once this highest-order positive 
norm is reached it is not possible to justify a legal claim by appeal to some higher-order 
positive norm. Instead the validity of the historically first constitution follows from it 
 
serving as a necessary presumption for the existence of the legal system in question (i.e. for 
the validity of all ‘lower-order’ legal claims). Note, however, that while it is possible only on 
the supposition of a Grundnorm, genuinely legal argument itself consists solely of appeal to 
norms that count as law by virtue of their source (i.e. their being posited in accordance with 
valid rules on law-creation), regardless of their merits.
Several conclusions may be drawn from even this brief overview of the range of different 
arguments for positivism. First, what follows from the adoption of legal positivism depends 
to some extent on a theorist’s reasons for doing so. Those who defend orthodox legal 
positivism on normative or conceptual grounds, for example, must either deny the 
possibility of any source of international law other than treaty and (perhaps) custom, or 
argue—implausibly, in my view—that every act of law-making by treaty organizations is 
ultimately consent-based because it is traceable to States’ consent to the organizations’ 
creation. In contrast, theorists (p. 329) like Kelsen or those who argue for positivism on the 
ground that it will spur a beneficial critical attitude to law can acknowledge the possibility 
that treaty organizations enjoy law-making authority without having to trace every exercise 
of that authority back to State consent. Similarly, positivists may also divide on the question 
of whether global administrative law qualifies as (international) law properly so-called, with 
the answer turning at least in part on the rationale for adopting a positivist understanding 
of law.16 A second, related, implication is that attempts to disprove positivism need to be 
carefully tailored to specific arguments offered in defence of that thesis. Consider the claim 
that we will do better overall at advancing justice by denying the legality of egregiously evil 
norms than by granting their legality but contesting their legitimacy. If true, it provides a 
compelling objection to the normative argument for positivism, but it in no way weakens 
either Raz’s or Kelsen’s arguments for it. Finally, attention to the specific rationales for 
positivism may contribute to the elaboration of different criteria for assessing or ranking 
possible sources of international law. For example, we might employ Raz’s account of law’s 
legitimacy to defend the superiority of multilateral treaties to custom on the grounds that 
the superior information gathering and deliberative qualities of the former method make it 
more likely that the resulting law successfully mediates between international legal 
subjects and the reasons that apply to them.17 Or we might reach the same conclusion 
regarding the superiority of treaty over custom on the basis of a normative argument for 
positivism that emphasizes the contribution it makes to the rule of law.18
Clearly much more needs to be said in defence of legal positivism. Rather than do so here, 
however, I propose to shift the focus of discussion to the second of the three argumentative 
tasks I identified at the outset as incumbent upon the legal positivist, namely the 
identification of the possible sources of law. Specifically, I turn in the remainder of this 
chapter to a consideration of what is widely viewed to be not only a possible but an actual 
source of international law, namely custom. My aim is twofold: first, to defend the 
superiority of a normative practice account of custom and custom-formation to both the 
orthodox and informal legislation accounts, and secondly, to present a preliminary 
argument for its compatibility with certain versions of legal positivism.
(p. 330) III.  Customary International Law Creation: Orthodox 
and Informal Legislation Accounts
On what is commonly labelled the orthodox view, customary international law (CIL) consists 
in the union of two elements: usus, or State practice, and opinio juris, understood as ‘the 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it’.19 Specific norms of CIL exist by virtue of the prevalence of these two elements among 
States, i.e. by virtue of most States either engaging in the practice in the belief that it has a 
particular legal valence or, in the case of allegedly conflicting practice, denying its 
performance or the characterization of the conduct in question as an instance of the 
practice with this particular legal valence. Perhaps the least controversial claim that might 
 
be made on behalf of the orthodox account of custom is that the presence of both elements 
provides compelling evidence for the existence of a norm of CIL.20
Disagreement quickly follows, however, with some theorists and legal officials arguing that 
one or the other of these two elements suffices for the identification of a norm of CIL, at 
least in certain circumstances or vis-à-vis norms with certain content. Matters become even 
more complicated when attention shifts from the epistemological question of identifying 
norms of CIL to the ontological question of creating new norms of CIL. The orthodox 
account seemingly confronts a paradox as it holds that to create a new norm of CIL 
mandating some practice States must act in the belief that international law already 
requires the practice in question. Yet until the process of customary law formation plays out 
successfully, that belief will be false. To avoid the conclusion that this chronological paradox 
renders the creation of CIL impossible, advocates of the orthodox view argue that it can be 
(and (p. 331) is) undertaken on the basis of a false belief regarding the legal status of the 
practice in question.21
Some critics reject the orthodox account of custom formation as implausible, while others 
reject it on the grounds that it conflicts with a fundamental requirement of legitimacy, 
namely that law be created transparently.22 For legal positivists, however, the most serious 
shortcoming with the orthodox account of custom formation concerns the absence within it 
of any act of positing or norm creation.23 The fact that States believe that a legal norm 
exists that requires them to behave in certain ways, even when conjoined with the fact that 
States generally behave in those ways, does not suffice to make it the case that the legal 
norm actually exists. Beliefs are facts (i.e. claims that A believes F are claims about how the 
world is), but one cannot derive an Ought, such as the normative claim constituted by a 
specific customary rule, from an Is. A widespread belief in the legal valence of some type of 
conduct may suffice to justify a descriptive or predictive claim. From a standpoint within 
the normative practice of giving legal reasons to justify or critique conduct, however, the 
mere fact that a certain act type is believed to be legally required does not provide the kind 
of claim needed to substantiate the assertion that subjects of that legal system should 
perform acts of that type.
A number of theorists argue that in the case of customary law formation opinio juris should 
be understood not as the belief that a customary legal norm C already exists, but that it 
should exist.24 This change alone does not address the gap between belief and norm 
creation, however.25 One solution is to treat CIL as judge-made law, with judicial 
pronouncements of customary legal norms playing a role analogous to the signing and 
ratification of treaties.26 In both cases a process of deliberation and negotiation among 
States regarding the desirability of a new legal norm culminates with the positing of an 
agreement; in the case of treaties, by States themselves, while (p. 332) in the case of 
‘custom’, by judges attempting to discern as best they can the legal valence (a majority of) 
States think it desirable to attach to some practice. The key point is that a broad consensus 
on the desirability of some conduct being subject to a customary legal norm does not suffice 
to make it so; rather, that outcome obtains only once a judge declares the existence of the 
customary legal norm in question.
I do not deny that international law can be, and perhaps sometimes is, created via the 
process just described. And clearly such a process is compatible with the positivist thesis 
that norms qualify as law solely because of their social source. However, I contend that 
judge-made law is better conceived as a type of informal legislation than as an account of 
customary law formation. The judicial legislation model of law-creation fails to capture the 
phenomenology of argument by appeal to customary norm, a phenomenology to which, for 
all its faults, the orthodox account remains true. Drawing on recent work by Gerald 
Postema, I now defend an account of custom and custom formation that remains true to the 
phenomenology of argument by appeal to customary rules while both avoiding the 
 
shortcomings of the orthodox account and drawing a categorical distinction between 
custom and legislation (whether by courts or legislative assemblies).
IV.  The Normative Practice Account of Custom and Custom 
Formation
Custom, Postema writes, exists only if it is ‘instantiated in the behavior of the people 
allegedly governed by it’.27 While custom is essentially a matter of what members of a 
community do, what they do cannot be grasped independently of the normative standards 
that inform their understanding of what they are doing.28 Rather:
Instances of behavior exhibit a custom-relevant regularity only when viewed as 
deeds—that is, as socially meaningful. And we can uncover this meaning only from 
within the practice.29
Why can the meaning that constitutes a pattern of behaviour as deeds only be accessed 
from within the practice; that is, from the standpoint of a competent participant in it? The 
answer is that the meaning of what participants do is cashed out (p. 333) in terms of a 
normative practice of holding themselves and one another responsible for their conduct. 
This involves judging certain performances as appropriate or correct and others as 
mistaken; acting in accordance with these judgements when the occasion arises; 
challenging conduct that falls short of these judgements; and recognizing appeals to these 
judgements as either vindicating action or providing valid criticism of it.30 The 
categorization of behaviour as the exercise or violation of a right, as permissible or 
obligatory, as respectful or rude, courageous or brazen, etc., is an understanding or 
interpretation agents arrive at as a result of being enmeshed in a particular, concrete, and 
historically situated ‘network of reason-seeking, reason-giving, and reason-using’.31
Custom, then, is not the product of some alchemical combination of usus and opinio juris, of 
objective behaviour and some subjective mental state. Rather, customs are a normative 
characterization and categorization of specific patterns of behaviour, an interpretation of 
those patterns as having a specific normative valence, which members of a group or 
community employ to hold one another responsible. Customs are realized in such practices; 
that is their mode of existence, and as a result they cannot be reduced to a conjunction of 
individual acts and/or beliefs.
The process of custom formation is an interpretive activity, one that takes as its object not 
words but acts. It involves the attribution of a specific social meaning to a specific pattern 
of behaviour constituted by the actions of members of the community. Justification proceeds 
by way of convincing other members of the community that a specific elaboration of a 
customary norm captures or reflects a way of valuing to which the community’s members 
are already committed; i.e. one already implicit in, or a ‘natural’ extension of, their existing 
normative practice. It takes place within the community’s practices of challenge and 
response. Within that practice, the explicit formulation of the customary norm may be 
novel, in the sense that a given occasion of challenge or response may be the first one in 
which an agent spells out a rule with some specific content that he takes to be part of the 
community’s normative practice. However, we should not confuse the first explicit 
formulation of the customary norm with its origin, since what an agent does in appealing to 
a customary norm for justificatory or critical purposes is to argue on the basis of a norm he 
takes to already exist latent in the community’s practices.32 Success in the deployment of a 
customary norm to justify or criticize an agent’s conduct is (p. 334) entirely a matter of its 
integration into the community’s practices of holding themselves and one another 
responsible; that is, their use of it in private deliberation and public argument. This is the 
sense in which, as Postema writes, ‘the activity of the practice, not any articulated account 
of it, nor theoretical reconstruction of it’, is authoritative.33 What matters is how community 
 
members actually go on, which specific forms of reason-seeking, reason-giving, and reason- 
using actually get taken up among members of the community.
The normative practice account of custom reveals that the shortcoming in the orthodox 
account lies not with its claim that the creation of a new customary norm requires that 
community members already believe themselves to be bound by the norm in question. 
Rather, the orthodox account errs in maintaining that such characterizations must be false, 
a conclusion drawn from the mistaken belief that specific customary norms come to exist by 
virtue of most members of a given community believing that they do. Consider the second of 
these two claims. On the normative practice account, specific customs exist in a given 
community because its members use them to challenge and respond, and interpretations of 
the patterns of behaviour in which members of the community are engaged succeed or fail 
in terms of their acceptance as challenges and responses. It may be true that customary 
norm C is a customary norm of this community, and members of the community may believe 
it is, but the truth of the later claim does not account for the truth of the former. Rather, the 
normative practice composed in part of norm C warrants the belief by members of the 
community (and others) that customary norm C exists as a norm of their community. In 
short, use of the norm warrants belief in its existence, rather than belief in the norm’s 
existence warranting its use.34
What, then, should we make of a customary norm C the first time, or number of times, 
members of a given community explicitly formulate it to challenge acts performed by other 
members, or to respond to challenges to acts they themselves performed? Integration into a 
community’s practice of holding agents responsible may not, and perhaps often will not, 
occur immediately upon the first public formulation and use of a putative customary 
norm.35 Rather, customary norm C may be integrated into the community’s normative 
practices only after an extended process of challenge and response. As part of that process 
members of the community will often work through alternative interpretations of their 
interactions. This will likely involve accepting or rejecting the use of rival putative 
customary norms to (p. 335) justify and criticize one another, competing efforts to read 
different social meanings into the pattern of behaviour picked out by C (or, more likely, a 
similar but not identical pattern of behaviour). It may also involve reflection on some of the 
ramifications the putative customary norm has for other customary norms members of the 
community currently employ. While that process is ongoing, it will be difficult to ascertain 
from an observer’s standpoint whether customary norm C exists in, or is a customary norm 
of, this community; i.e. whether a statement to that effect is true or false. However, 
members of the community who employ the norm to justify or criticize conduct will take 
themselves to make true claims, meaning ones they take to accurately reflect an 
understanding of what is permissible, obligatory, respectful, etc., already present in the 
community’s way of life. Whether those norms really do so turns on how the process of 
challenge and response plays out. If customary norm C is integrated into the community’s 
normative practices, if it becomes widely used by members of the community to hold one 
another (and themselves) responsible, then even the first agent who competently employs 
the norm to defend himself or criticize another makes a true claim, while those who deny 
the norm are mistaken. Conversely, if customary norm C is not integrated into the 
community’s normative practices, then those who employ it in an attempt to justify or 
criticize do so mistakenly; in some respects they have a false understanding of the 
community’s normative practices, of the social meaning that the community ‘reads in’ the 
pattern of behaviour partly constitutive of its members’ interactions with one another. As 
noted above, what is determinative is the practice itself, how the process of challenge and 
 
response really plays out, not any member’s or even all the members’ articulation of the 
norm.
Contrary to the orthodox account of opinio juris, ‘early employers’ of a customary norm that 
achieves uptake in any given community believe correctly that the norm to which they 
advert already exists as a norm of their community. This point is crucial; interpretive 
disputes over what members of the community are doing—over the normative valence of 
one or another pattern of behaviour in which members of the community engage—are 
disputes over how things are, not how they should be. Challenges and responses employing 
a putative customary norm assert that a given pattern of behaviour already has a certain 
normative valence within the community, albeit one heretofore inchoate or incompletely 
spelled out. Its successful integration into the community’s normative practices simply 
constitutes acceptance of this claim by the bulk of the community’s members.
Dissatisfaction with this view may be attributable to the following belief: if there is a fact of 
the matter regarding C’s existence as a customary norm of a given community, then it ought 
to be possible for members of that community (and perhaps external observers as well) to 
ascertain it without having to wait to see if members of the community are successful or 
unsuccessful in using it for justification and criticism. This belief rests on two mistaken 
assumptions, however. First, it misconstrues customary norms as objects of intellectual 
apprehension (p. 336) when they are really components of a practical skill. The only way to 
test one’s skill in navigating interactions with other members of the community according 
to the community’s norms is to deploy them to hold oneself and others responsible, since 
only one’s success or failure in doing so reveals how well one grasps (or knows, in a 
practical sense) the community’s customary norms.36 Secondly, the inference from 
disagreement to the absence of any correct answer regarding a customary norm’s status in 
a given community gives an unwarranted priority to epistemology over ontology.37
The advantages of the normative practice account of custom are not limited to avoiding the 
so-called chronological paradox. For example, it accounts for the fact that customary norms 
typically bind all members of a given community regardless of whether they consent to 
those norms, or even could consent to them. Customary norms bind agents by virtue of 
their being participants in the normative practice those norms constitute; they bind agents 
by virtue of their membership in the community, simultaneously constituting them as 
members of the community (i.e. as juridical persons, bearers of rights and responsibilities) 
and constituting the community of which they are members. Indeed, the normative practice 
account clarifies why even agents who object to ‘evolving’ customs are nevertheless bound 
by those norms if they become integrated into the community’s practices of challenge and 
response.38 The normative practice account also sheds light on custom’s reform. Given that 
customs exist by virtue of being practiced, the creation of a new norm sometimes requires 
conduct at odds with an existing one, or perhaps more accurately, with what some members 
of the community take to be an existing customary norm. Since patterns of behaviour are 
always subject to multiple interpretations, they can be simultaneously construed as norm- 
violative and as contributions to the development or recognition of a new customary 
norm.39 A community member who attempts to reform one or more of its customary norms 
will concede that his conduct conflicts with what some other members of the community 
take its normative valence to be. But he will also contest their (perhaps implicit) claim to 
have correctly formulated the social meaning of such conduct, in effect charging them with 
a failure to be properly attuned to the ways in which the community’s understanding of its 
own normative practices has changed.
Thus far I have described the normative practice account as a theory of custom; is it ipso 
facto a theory of customary international law? Elsewhere I argue that we should distinguish 
between the creation of a customary norm and that norm’s legal (p. 337) validity.40 The 
latter property, I contend, follows from the practice of officials in a legal system recognizing 
that customary norm as law. This is a contingent practice, however; it may extend only to 
 
some of a community’s customary norms, as I contend is the case for the customary norms 
that govern States’ international relations. Moreover, some legal systems may not recognize 
custom as a source of law at all. If so, a complete theory of CIL requires both an account of 
custom and an account of how custom becomes law. What the arguments in this section 
demonstrate, though, is that many of the alleged theoretical challenges to customary 
international law are really challenges to custom per se, independent of its being 
recognized as law.
V.  Positivism and the Normative Practice Account of Custom 
and Custom Formation
Whatever its virtues, positivists may question the compatibility of the normative practice 
account of custom and custom formation with their own commitment to the view that norms 
count as law only by virtue of their social source, regardless of their merits. In the space 
remaining I make an initial effort to assuage such worries, focusing particularly on Kelsen’s 
and Raz’s respective arguments for positivism.
Kelsen maintains that law must be the product of an act of willing or positing. Given such 
an understanding, we may struggle to make sense of customary international law, which 
‘seems to be unintentional, undirected, and unwilled human activity’.41 Kelsen’s solution is 
to characterize opinio juris as a collective act of will; specifically an act of collectively 
willing that members of a given community ought to behave as they have been behaving. 
How should we understand the idea of collective willing here? I suggest we do so in terms 
of the normative practice account of custom and custom formation described above. That 
account enables us to explain the collective aspect of custom formation to which Kelsen 
rightly points, since a customary norm exists in any given community only if it is integrated 
into that community’s practice of holding people responsible. Furthermore, it reflects how 
customary norms are created or made by members of the community through a process of 
challenge and response in which social meaning is read into or used to cognize their 
interactions with one another. True, on the normative practice (p. 338) account of custom 
formation novel attempts to explicitly formulate norms perceived as latent in the 
community’s existing practices are not conceived of as the intentional willing or positing of 
a new norm. But Kelsen, at least, does not appear to equate the willing necessary for the 
existence of a positive norm with legislation. Rather, he claims that ‘custom is, just like a 
legislative act, a mode for creating law’.42 Indeed, once we distinguish custom from 
legislation as a means for creating norms, and characterize the former in terms of the 
normative practice account, we can see that custom is not only willed but also intentional 
and directed. Customary norms arise because of agents directing normative claims at one 
another with the intention that the targets of those claims guide their conduct according to 
the norm referenced in the claim (i.e. the challenge or response). The perception that 
customary norms are the product of a process that is neither intentional nor directed rests 
on the assumption that acts of willing or positing norms must be legislative.
Finally, the normative practice account explains custom’s normativity without falling foul of 
the Is–Ought distinction that figures centrally in Kelsen’s theory of law. The justification for 
a customary norm (an Ought) requiring some act-type is not found in the fact (an Is) that 
members of a given community perform, or have long performed, that act. Nor is that fact 
rendered normative by another fact, namely the belief that members of the community 
ought to perform tokens of that act-type. Rather, the very cognition of a certain behaviour 
as an act of some type or other, e.g. as obligatory or permissible, is normative. Thus, when a 
member of a given community challenges another’s performance of a certain act, or 
responds to such a challenge, with the claim ‘that’s not how we do it around here’, that is 
not a descriptive claim regarding the sort of behaviour that might be observed or predicted, 
 
but a normative claim that implicitly references the social meaning read into that behaviour 
that renders it not to be done.
Recall that Raz argues that law must be positive if it is to be authoritative; that is, if it is to 
be capable of mediating between agents and the reasons that apply to them. The key 
question, then, is whether on the normative practice account of custom it is possible for 
agents to guide their conduct according to a customary rule without reflecting on the 
reasons for having that rule. It might be thought that this question must be answered in the 
negative on the ground that members of a given community must interpret their 
interactions with other members of the community in order to identify the customary norms 
that bind them. This is false. Members of a community frequently learn its customary rules 
through instruction by other members recognized as enjoying significant mastery of its 
normative practices in light of their successful participation in them over a lengthy period 
of time.43 In the case of (p. 339) customary international law, this takes the form of 
experienced international lawyers educating new members of that field as well as other 
legal officials, corporate officers, etc.44 Nor need testimony and instruction be personal; the 
public promulgation of customary rules as well as their codification can also play a part. In 
all these cases members of the relevant community, e.g. the legal officials whose conduct 
constitutes the international acts of the States in which they occupy offices, will be able to 
identify what the rules are without recourse to the reasons on the basis of which those who 
created the rules did so. Moreover, since the ability to successfully navigate a community’s 
normative practices is a practical skill, those who have developed it to a high degree will 
often succeed in identifying its customary norms without recourse to expert testimony or 
codification. None of this is to deny that agents may sometimes be uncertain or mistaken 
regarding the normative valence custom attaches to a specific pattern of behaviour. Nor is 
it at odds with the claim that uncertainty and the incidence of mistakes are likely to 
intensify rapidly as the social, natural, and technological environment in which members of 
a community interact becomes increasingly complex and dynamic. However, these points 
merely indicate the limits of rule-guided behaviour in general and customary rule-guided 
behaviour particularly. As long as customary rules can sometimes be learned and reliably (if 
not infallibly) deployed by community members to navigate their interactions with one 
another, the normative practice account is consistent with Raz’s argument for positivism.
Finally, the central role that the normative practice of custom assigns to interpretation in 
the creation of new customary norms poses no threat to the positivist’s account of what 
makes norms legal. True, the normative interpretation of some pattern of behaviour 
necessarily rests on an appeal to some value or values, some perhaps implicit purpose or 
end best served by understanding that pattern of behaviour as obligatory, permissible, etc. 
But in that respect it differs in no way from the typical process of legislation, formal or 
informal. Furthermore, on the normative practice account interpretation alone does not 
create a customary norm, nor does the success of any given interpretation rest on its being 
the objectively best (moral) construction of the community’s existing normative practice. 
Rather, an interpretation of a pattern of behaviour succeeds as custom formation if, and 
only if it is integrated into the community’s practices of holding themselves and one another 
responsible. That is the ‘social fact’ that constitutes the existence of customary norms.
In this chapter I have considered legal positivism as a conceptual claim regarding law, and 
so international law; specifically, the claim that the existence of law is a matter of its social 
source, regardless of its merits.45 Arguments offered in defence (p. 340) of this claim can be 
categorized as descriptive, normative, and conceptual, from which it follows that the 
success of any particular criticism of legal positivism as an accurate characterization of 
(international) law depends on the specific type of defence offered for that characterization. 
In addition to arguing for the claim that law is necessarily a social fact, legal positivists 
should, and often do strive to give an account of the possible sources of law; i.e. the types of 
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